Are Britain's Business Leaders Seeking Shelter for Domestic Businesses from FDI?

Kraft Foods’ acquisition of Cadbury PLC has led at least one prominent British policymaker and one prominent business leader to consider whether Britain should take steps they believe will discourage short-term investment in its companies and encourage long-term investment, as if the two can be distinguished.  They are suggesting that legal and regulatory changes may be necessary to offset the market’s focus on short-term trading in favor of what they perceive as Britain’s need to retain the benefits of long-term investment. They appear to be advocating these changes without regard to the detrimental effects that their protectionist actions will have on worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI), including that originating in Britain. 

In an opinion piece published in the Financial Times in mid-January, Peter Mandelson, Britain’s Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, asked what steps might be taken to better align the interests of short-term and long-term investors and the interests of the owners and managers of publicly listed companies. He argued that financial markets often separate financial assets from real assets, with the consequence that the trading of financial assets leads to insufficient recognition of the importance of real assets. Lord Mandelson convened a roundtable discussion with investors, fund managers and company executives to establish a dialogue between investors and management of the companies in which they invest. The implication is that the lack of alignment between these groups too often results in a takeover of a real asset which in turn leads to the loss of the business itself to Britain. Additionally, the inability to assemble a pool of “patient capital” may be at odds with Britain’s needs for new technologies and infrastructure investment.

 

Lord Mandelson made clear that he was displeased with the failure of mergers and acquisitions strategies to create additional long-term value during the past 20 years. Although acknowledging that M&A can create economies of scale and technology synergies, he advocated openness by acquirors with respect to their intentions and robust criticism by shareholders. It is difficult to disagree with his analysis of the problem.  The recommendations for cure are quite another matter. 

 

More recently, Roger Carr, the chairman of Cadbury who resigned on February 3, called for an overhaul of M&A regulation in the UK. Mr Carr is arguing that his country’s regulatory scheme for takeovers works against the long-term interests of British businesses. According to news reports, he cited takeover practices as predatory and stated that the current rules reward short-term traders at the expense of owners with longer-term views. He suggested that the rules had resulted in too many UK business being sold off to foreigners, and that the sale of a domestic business to a foreign business was a loss to the UK. His sentiments were plainly protectionist and sounded like those of a sore loser. He seems to have said little about those UK companies who have walked the globe, acquiring businesses for strategic and other reasons or those UK businesses, such as Cadbury itself, who build plants outside of the UK to enhance profits.  

 

The thrust of the comments of both Lord Mandelson and Mr. Carr is that differentiation should be made between those who will hold their shares for the long term and those who will not. However, a requirement that shareholders be locked in or locked up means that investors give up their ability to sell their shares when the situation warrants. This stratagem shifts risk to shareholders, who will expect and in fact be entitled to a greater reward. These types of restrictions have existed in the past and have often allowed management to be less accountable to owners, since the owners cannot exercise their right to show their ultimate displeasure—by exiting their investment. 

 

Ultimately, however, changes in risk allocation and the balance of management/owner power in one geographic market can disadvantage companies in that market in terms of global capital allocation. If investment in British companies is stickier than in U.S. or Australian companies, then British companies may well lose value in comparison with their non-British peers. Given choices, FDI will always seek investment opportunities that are less encumbered. 

Then again, Lord Mandelson and Mr. Carr may believe that it is Britain’s best interest to erect a wall around its industry, buying some time to create Britain’s future. Deflecting foreign ownership will, however, likely lead to retaliation. It would not be surprising if other countries were to preclude British business from investing in or acquiring their businesses. Worse yet, it could lead to rounds of similar restrictions on investment in other developed countries and then to trade restrictions. This could have a disastrous effect on FDI and the strong world economy that has been developing since 1945, despite the shocks of 2008. Lord Mandelson and Mr. Carr could better serve their countrymen by leading UK businesses to build stockholder loyalty through the creation of true stockholder value and to be strong competitors in the world economy. 

FDI Issues to Track in 2010

FDI promises to grow in importance to both developed and the developing economies in the new year. The world economy as a whole has not fully recovered from the slowdown of the past three years. What recovery has occurred has been selective, leading to stronger economies in some cases and leaving weaker economies in others. The imbalance suggests that opportunities for cross-border investments and M&A activities will abound and that those businesses, funds and individuals that have available capital will likely pursue them.

Heightened FDI activity will raise issues in the media, in academia and elsewhere. The issues that will garner the greatest attention are likely to be:

  • Protectionism. If there is a sudden, large upturn in FDI into developed economies, will more inbound transactions be challenged by regulatory authorities? At the end of 2009, the Obama administration prevented the acquisition of FirstGold by a Chinese acquirer on national security grounds. Will this be interpreted as protectionism disguised? CFIUS has rarely outright blocked deals in the past, so a moderate increase in number of challenged deals may well be interpreted as a change in political attitude. Complicating the assessment is that foreign buyers will likely be shopping for natural resources business and high technology firms – both of which may have assets that are inordinately valuable and difficult to find elsewhere. These values may raise the stakes to investee nations when control of these assets is shifted offshore.
  • Credit Squeeze. Buyers and investors with strong credit lines will likely be very attractive to targets who are starved for debt and equity capital. Distressed assets are in strong supply and can often be revitalized with infusions from capital from new owners with adequate capital supplies. Will buyers and investors remain disciplined and limit their capital at risk, or will there be “shopping sprees” as holdout sellers give up, price spreads narrow and well-endowed players run the table?
  • FDI Extends the Service Sector. Economies that have built their capacities and economic fortunes on exports of manufactured goods with price advantages will seek to compete more aggressively by incorporating more of the value chain into their enterprises. They may wish to acquire design capability and marketing interface directly with their ultimate customers. Confronted with the question of “buy or build,” some businesses will look to acquire or invest in businesses that provide those services. This means businesses whose assets go home at night. From an operational perspective, this will raise issues of conflicting corporate cultures. Return on investments into service companies can also be more difficult to measure than investments in hard assets. The range of results on these deals will likely be broader than in other investments.
  • Developed Assets More Desirable. For investors in the U.S. and Europe, assets – both hard and soft – that are developed and therefore require minimal additional expenditure, are likely to be more desirable than those requiring considerable additional investment. Consequently, in both developed and developing economies, greenfield investments may have a difficult time competing for investment capital. For outbound investors in China – where capital appears to be less constrained and risk tolerance may be greater – greenfield investments in the energy and agricultural sectors will remain top priorities. There may be a strong divergence that is building, with those economies and businesses in need of significant capital infusions turning away from investors in the developed nations and looking almost exclusively to investors in emerging economies.
  • What Direction for Global M&A? The year 2009 brought a large number of strategic cross-border mergers and acquisitions, many with high profiles. The trend toward consolidation within industries will accelerate – the Kraft/Cadbury transaction being the poster child for these deals. Absent from the space at this time are the financial players, such as the private equity funds who have relied on leverage to complete their acquisitions and generate their returns. Will private equity and other private investors step back into the ring before credit has become more available, or will financial deals continue to lag strategic deals? The lack of clarity ahead for many businesses also adds uncertainty regarding valuation and pricing. With these factors taken all together, the return of robust cross-border M&A transactions does not seem imminent.

If we gain information on these FDI issues in the next six months, then the last half of 2010 may appear to be more predictable, especially if it is more in line with past trends. Given the change in direction that 2008 and 2009 brought compared to the immediately preceding years, any predictions – at any point – may deny the reality that volatility persists, even in FDI.

Nationalist Sentiment vs. FDI: Bharti Airtel Leads to Important Questions re: Candid Policy Toward FDI

The proposed business combination between India’s Bharti Airtel and South Africa’s MTN Group collapsed at the beginning of last month. Local and international politics appear to have played a substantial role in its demise. Therefore, some important questions should be posed. To what extent was the collapse a result of nationalism or protectionism masquerading as a different public policy? Is the withdrawal of that deal evidence of a wider global trend that may make foreign direct investment (FDI) more difficult to execute? As government stimulus programs end, will governments—U.S. and otherwise—use their power to shield companies that have been nursed through the downturn from foreign takeovers? 

Bharti is Asia’s leading integrated telecom services provider, with operations in India and Sri Lanka. MTN is South Africa’s leading mobile and fixed-line telecom company, with over 100 million subscribers and operations in over 20 countries in Africa and the Middle East. Their proposed combination was negotiated from the end of May to the end of September and had a value of approximately $24 billion. Bharti would have received a 49% stake in MTN, while MTN and its shareholders would have received a 36% stake in Bharti. The combined enterprise would have been the world’s third largest telecom company. 

The ominous notes for FDI come from reports in Dealbook and elsewhere that the South African government failed to approve the transaction because of protectionism and nation-building policies. This outcome was not necessarily predictable because both the Indian and South African governments have supported increased trade among developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. That “South–South” trade is intended to offset growing Chinese economic influence in the region.

Dealbook also reported that interventions by both Indian and South African governments imposed conditions that led to the end of the deal. The South African government required that MTN keep South African management in place and maintain a listing on the Johannesburg stock exchange in addition to its listing on the Mumbai exchange. Indian financial regulators were unwilling to waive their rules against dual listings. 

The South African blog SAgoodnews pointed out that there is a long history of dual listed companies and saw no reason why that requirement should have been terminal for the transaction. The blog also dismisses arguments that national political and labor pressures were at fault.

The Indian blog Trak.in News asserts that the Indian government had backed the deal at the highest level, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressly giving the combination his support. The blog also suggests that the real issue was whether the national character of the combined business would be Indian of South African. South Africa’s insistence on the dual listing was a cover for this point. On the other side, the Indian authorities believed, but seem not to have stated, that the dual listing would effectively set a conversion rate for the rupee that could differ from the official rate of exchange. 

Both companies’ share prices rose after termination was announced. Stock analysts who had trepidations were pleased to see the transaction crater. It therefore is possible that, in addition to political agendas, there were financial issues underlying the headline events. Investors may not have been as supportive of the transaction as were the managements of Bharti and MTN. 

After September 30, both governments issued the usual palliatives, saying that they remain open for business and underscoring the importance of FDI. Rather than helping business decide whether to pursue cross-border deals in emerging economies, however, these positions and unarticulated rationales only obscure the facts. The recovery from the worldwide turndown is in its early stages. Obfuscations and half-truths do not bring recovery any nearer, as they only add uncertainty where business strategists would prefer to deal with articulated policies and certainties. 

What is true for developing economies such as South Africa and India is also true for the United States. Efforts to generate inbound investment must be very transparent and free from hidden conditions. Actual decisions and measures must align with policy pronouncements. In an environment in which the U.S. is hotly competing with other countries for inbound FDI, the U.S. government cannot afford to be less than utterly committed to inbound investors. Anything less will lead those investors to look for greener pastures—a lesson that South Africa may yet learn.