Up to Bat Again - Will it be Strike Two for Huawei in the United States?

Top Chinese telecom equipment manufacturer Huawei Technologies is at it again. Back in 2008 Huawei made an attempt to participate with Bain Capital’s proposed acquisition of 3Com Corporation. The deal didn’t go through. There was much speculation that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) determination that Huawei had ties to China’s People's Liberation Army and posed a threat on national security grounds. The failed transaction is discussed in more detail in a past December 2009 blog posting.

Huawei’s latest endeavor, despite continuing U.S. security concerns, is its reported bid for a unit of Motorola, the U.S. mobile phone manufacturer. Earlier this year, Motorola announced a plan to split into two separately traded companies, one for mobile and home business and the other focusing on enterprise mobility and networks business. In March, Motorola Co-CEO Greg Brown paved the way for a sale or merger of its mobile network business unit

Huawei is considered the most probable potential buyer and intends to expand its sales in the North American market.

Since Huawei has lost major deals in the past because of political and security fears, the company is considering negotiating a "mitigation agreement" with CFIUS to show its willingness to cooperate with the United States government.

When asked about its motivation to enter such an agreement, Charlie Chen, senior vice-president of marketing at Huawei, responded to questions by the Financial Times, "We are aware that some in the U.S. government have expressed concerns about Huawei and we will work diligently to address those concerns."

If Huawei does manage to receive approval from the U.S. government, the Huawei-Motorola deal could create a new powerhouse and increase competition among the other major mobile network equipment manufacturers: Nokia-Siemens, Cisco, Alcatel-Lucent and Ericsson. It is uncertain whether or not Huawei’s bid will be successful, but it all may not be lost for Huawei in the United States.  

Huawei Technologies Ascends Despite 2008 CFIUS Turndown

In the U.S. press, almost all mention of Huawei Technologies recites like a mantra the 2008 refusal by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to permit it to participate with Bain Capital’s in Bain's proposed acquisition of 3Com Corporation. The consensus line is that CFIUS determined that Huawei’s connections with the government of the People’s Republic of China might have been too strong and therefore refused to approve the deal. The failed transaction is often cited as evidence that the U.S. government will not permit Chinese investment in or acquisition of U.S. high technology businesses. Experts contend that the outcome continues to dissuade Chinese investors from acquisitions of U.S. businesses. 

According to an article by Kevin J. O’Brien in the New York Times on November 30, however, Huawei has in a remarkably short timeframe become a communications equipment powerhouse without the 3Com acquisition and now wields significant market power both with China's mobile networks and around the globe.  

 

According to the article, Huawei now is established as a serious competitor, winning contracts from major phone networks in Europe and elsewhere on the globe, beating the likes of Ericsson and Nokia Siemens Networks. Huawei has a 20.1% market share of the global equipment market. It ranks as the number 2 supplier of mobile phone systems in the world. Its quarterly sales now are greater than Alcatel-Lucent and Nokia Siemens. It supplies 36 of the top 50 mobile operators, including Cox Communications, Leap and Clearwire in the U.S. The article reports that customers have investigated the ownership of Huwaei, said to be a private company, and concluded that its ownership would not be a factor.

 

It seems likely that U.S. companies will increasingly become customers of Huawei because of its versatile products and their low cost of operation. Huawei has obviously found a way to prosper here and elsewhereeven if the U.S. government did not think it a suitable owner for a U.S. business. It’s not clear whether the CFIUS decision produced any long-term benefit here at all. And it’s certainly not clear from what national security risk CFIUS protected the U.S.

 

The ascension of Huawei to prime global competitor status illustrates that a robust multinational high technology enterprise does not need a U.S. base, whether bought or built. Regrettably, it also demonstrates that as a result of the CFIUS decision, the U.S. has lost out on direct contributions to its economy through jobs, purchases from local U.S. vendors and the use of U.S-created R&D. 

 

Is CFIUS Review a "Customary Regulatory Approval"?

A lawsuit that could have determined whether a filing made with CFIUS can be considered customary has ended. In May 2009, husband and wife Joseph and Judy Ehrenreich sued 3Com Corporation for damages they allegedly suffered from the loss in value of their 3Com shares. The case was brought under the provision of the federal securities laws that enables purchasers of stock to recover losses arising out of incorrect or incomplete statements made by the issuer of the shares. 3Com is a Massachusetts-based enterprise networking solutions provider.

The Ehrenreichs claimed that the cause of their loss was 3Com’s failure to specify that CFIUS review of its proposed merger with affiliates of Bain Capital was a significant risk. 3Com had published a press release announcing the proposed merger on September 28, 2007. The press release stated that the merger was subject to “customary regulatory approvals.” CFIUS review was not mentioned. The plaintiffs purchased 13,000 shares of 3Com stock after the announcement of the proposed merger.

The basis of the plaintiff’s case was that the proposed merger did truly raise serious national security concerns and that, as a result, CFIUS review was not customary. The plaintiffs interpreted “customary” to mean perfunctory or ministerial. The aspect of the merger that triggered CFIUS review was that, as part of the transaction, affiliates of China’s largest network equipment company, Huawei Technologies, were to acquire an interest in 3Com. Press reports associated Huawei with China’s military and possible links to Chinese cyber warfare efforts against the U.S. and the U.S. military. Although 3Com disclosed on October 4, 2007 that it intended to make a CFIUS filing, the plaintiffs contended that 3Com’s announcement omitted the reasons for seeking the review and downplayed the risk that CFIUS could block the transaction. Five months later, 3Com withdrew its CFIUS filing. One month later, the parties terminated their merger. The announced reason was that CFIUS intended to prohibit the deal. The price of 3Com stock plummeted from its level at the time of the original announcement.

The complaint claims that the peculiar structure of FINSA – its voluntary and not mandatory filing requirement -- gives parties an incentive not to mention the possibility of CFIUS review. It suggests that parties might try to “fly under the radar screen” and not provoke public reaction to a deal.

We will not know from this case whether 3Com’s initial failure to specify CFIUS review and the basis on which CFIUS could review the transaction was an incorrect or incomplete statement. The plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew on June 30, dismissing their case with prejudice. A settlement may have occurred. Even if abandoned at this stage, the case stands as a warning to parties contemplating a CFIUS filing. When communicating to the markets, it’s best to say more about the likelihood of a CFIUS review rather than less. Parties now are on notice that CFIUS review may be more than perfunctory. It’s safer to make that clear if the review leads to an unexpected end to the deal.

Identifying Those Mergers, Acquisitions and Investments That Are Subject to U.S. Government Regulation

Analysts and others who follow mergers, acquisitions and other foreign direct investment into the United States can often be frustrated in their attempt to learn what inbound deals are being subjected to U.S. governmental scrutiny.  Other than occasional press releases, little useful information that is transaction-specific seems to be available. There was press coverage of  the proposed merger transaction among affiliates of Bain Capital Partners, 3 Com Corporation and Huawei Technologies of China in 2007 and 2008.  That transaction did not survive govenmental scrutiny.  More recently, in mid-May of this year, Rio Tinto and Chinalco announced that they had obtained U.S. government approval for both the proposed issue of convertible bonds to Chinalco and the indirect minority investment in Kennecott Copper Coporation, as contemplated by their February 2009 strategic transaction. 

The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, known by its acronym CFIUS, is the regulator that oversees foreign direct investment, make certain limited information available.  On November 14, 2008, CFIUS, sent its most recent Annual Report to Congress.  CFIUS operates under The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, or FINSA .  FINSA mandates that CFIUS prepare and send this report.    One month later, CFIUS made available to the public an unclassified version of the report  that presents only aggregate information.  The 2007 Annual Report  covers the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, when there was considerably more inbound M&A and inbound investment activity into the U.S., as well as more cross-border transaction activity generally, than currently.

The unclassified version of the report does not identify the foreign persons or the U.S. businesses involved. The data is segmented by business sector of the U.S. business and by nationality of the foreign person. There is no specification of whether the basis of the national security considerations was the nexus of the U.S. business with U.S. national security or the identity of the acquiring foreign party.

Some of the data in the report, however, is helpful in determining those standards that buyers and sellers are following. CFIUS’ annual report states that, in 2007, parties filed 138 notices of transactions with CFIUS. The unclassified version of the report provides only aggregate data with respect to the filed submissions. To summarize, for 2007:

  • of the 138 filed notices, ten notices (7%) were withdrawn during the CFIUS national security review and five (4%) were withdrawn during the CFIUS national security investigation;
  • the parties to three of the five transactions that withdrew their filings during investigation subsequently refiled them, and the refilings led to conclusion without action;
  • the parties to two other transactions withdrawn during investigation abandoned their transactions; and
  • the parties to the remaining withdrawn application restructured the transaction such that the foreign party no longer gained control over the U.S. person.

The report does not indicate whether or how many of the transactions that were withdrawn during the national security review were later resubmitted with or without restructuring. Unlike 2006, when the President acted to suspend two transactions, the President did not suspend or prohibit any transactions during 2007.

In response to FINSA’s mandate that the report provide “[s]pecific, cumulative and, as appropriate, trend information,” the annual report presents aggregate statistics regarding 313 transactions for the period 2005 through 2007. In summary, during those three years, 24 notices (8%) were withdrawn during the CFIUS national security review, 15 notices (5%) resulted in investigations and 2 notices (1%) resulted in a Presidential decision. Although the statistics indicated that the number of notices filed increased year-to-year from 64 to 111 to 138, the data, presented below, show no other clear trends. 

Source:  CFIUS 2008 Annual Report

To put these numbers of filings in to context, the number of transactions in which foreign buyers acquired U.S. business were substantially larger. CFIUS filings were made only in a small fraction of cases. According to Capital IQ, there were 657 completed inbound acquisition transactions in 2005, 889 in 2006 and 1,076 in 2008. The percentage of these transactions as to which the parties filed CFIUS notices were 10% in 2005, 12.5% in 2006 and 12.8% in 2007, or an overall percentage of 11.9% for the three-year period. The trend line is moving upward, although only slightly so.

Pursuant to the mandate in FINSA, the report analyzes the notices that were filed during the three-year period by business sector and the countries originating the transactions. This is the data that may be most useful to determine what parties have chosen to voluntarily submit their notices. The business sectors represented and the most-often reported business segments within those sectors, measured by percentage of the total 313 filings, were:

 Source:  CFIUS 2008 Annual Report

Business sectors of business segments with respect to which parties made filings, but not in statistically significant (i.e., 5% or more) numbers, included:

  • Chemical (within Manufacturing)                   –      12 filings
  • Primary metal (within Manufacturing)           –         7 filings
  • Machinery (within Manufacturing)                  –       16 filings

Within the 51 Computer and Electronic Product segment filings were filings by businesses that manufacture semiconductors and other electronic components (21 filings) and that manufacture navigational, measuring, electromedical and control instruments (13 filings). Within the 52 Professional, Scientific and Technical Services segment filings were businesses that provided architectural, engineering and related services (21 filings) and that provided computer systems designed related services (also 21 filings). 

Because FINSA prohibts CFIUS from presenting transaction-by-transaction data, parties looking for  precedent or practices by others will benefit by keeping these statistics in mind.  Given the business risks for failing to file the voluntary notice, the parties are well-advised to make conservative judgments and build compliance with the filing process into their deal budgets and timelines.  Qualified legal advisors can assist buyers, sellers, investors and investees in complying with U.S. government review efficiently and effectively.