Coming to America

Ameek Ponda and Douglas Stransky, partners in Sullivan & Worcester’s Tax Department, co-authored the following article. Mr. Ponda is the director of the Tax Department and a member of the Firm's Management Committee. He concentrates his practice in structuring corporate mergers and acquisitions, advising emerging companies on financing and business issues, designing REIT transactions and financial instruments, and working on cross-border financings and acquisitions. Mr. Stransky concentrates his practice on international tax planning. He has structured numerous tax efficient international mergers, acquisitions, dispositions and reorganizations for a broad spectrum of public and private clients in the financial services, life sciences, manufacturing, private equity, technology and venture capital industries.

 

United States businesses of all sizes and sectors are more likely than ever to be targeted by buyers from around the globe, including buyers from rapidly emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India, Israel, and Russia. This “inbound” deal flow stems from the convergence of several trends, including globalization, the rise of sovereign wealth funds and a weakened U.S. dollar. In addition, the United States’ comparatively welcoming legal and regulatory environment signals to the rest of the world that “America is open for business.”

In Massachusetts, some notable inbound deals over the last 18 months included the $11.6 billion acquisition of GE Plastics by Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation, the $8.8 billion purchase of Millennium Pharmaceuticals by Japan’s Takeda Pharmaceutical Co., the $3.9 billion acquisition of Putnam Investments by Canada’s Great-West Lifeco, Inc., the $2.6 billion purchase of Sepracor, Inc. by Japan’s Dainippon Sumitomo Pharma Co., and the $1.7 billion acquisition of Samsonite Corporation by United Kingdom-based CVC Capital Partners Ltd. 

 

Cross-border deals are always more complex than comparable domestic ones. They involve at least two sets of legal and regulatory frameworks, additional currencies, multiple languages and time zones, and potentially significant differences in business culture. Foreign investors and U.S. sellers exploring inbound deals should proceed with informed boldness when developing transaction strategies.

 

On the sell side, understanding the foreign buyer’s goals and recognizing its possible inexperience with U.S. laws and commercial customs and practices will go a long way toward maximizing value in the deal and ensuring a smoother process. For example, a foreign buyer will likely not be familiar with U.S. employment laws, tort litigation, etc., which are markedly different than those of many other countries.

 

On the buy side, it is critical for foreign investors to understand U.S. laws and commercial customs and practices. Successful execution is more art than science, and early involvement by experienced U.S. advisors will be important. For example, in contrast to market practice in other parts of the world, there is generally less emphasis on due diligence in the United States, particularly protracted, intrusive due diligence, and instead a reliance on seller representations and associated indemnities. Of course, exceptions to this general rule exist when statutes, cases, and regulations have expanded successor liability into particular areas, and thus more due diligence may be appropriate, for example, with respect to environmental, employment/benefits, money laundering and international trade issues. 

Another consideration for inbound mergers and acquisitions is the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (“FINSA”). Under FINSA, the President is authorized to block certain foreign acquisitions, takeovers or mergers if they are considered threats to national security. Foreign governments investing through sovereign wealth funds attract scrutiny under these rules, as do any foreign investments in U.S. infrastructure, energy assets or sensitive technologies. Where both a foreign government and a sensitive industry are present, the scrutiny can be intense – witness the CNOOC and Dubai Ports World tempests. By limiting the focus of the review to U.S. national security matters and by minimizing political exposure during the review process, FINSA has defused much of the potential for controversy. Although only certain inbound transactions implicate FINSA, the parties need to plan and structure carefully to ensure their transactions are well received by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, which is responsible for FINSA review. 

 

Whether or not the proposed acquisition implicates a substantive antitrust problem, it may be necessary, depending on the size of the transaction, to report the acquisition in advance to the U.S. competition agency under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, or HSR Act. The purpose of the HSR Act is to give U.S. authorities time to review a proposed transaction for its anti-competitive effects. The HSR filing typically has minimal impact on the timeline to closing, but sometimes can result in substantive review with additional delay or, worse, a determination that the transaction has an anti-competitive effect. Although most U.S. targets preparing for a sale are well aware of the HSR Act, some foreign investors may be less familiar with its provisions.

Additional restrictions or considerations for inbound deals include annual reporting to the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis if a foreign person acquires more than 10 percent of a U.S. target, and to the Department of Agriculture for certain inbound real estate acquisitions involving farmland, including timberland. 

 

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) may also challenge a foreign buyer where the target is a U.S. company with extensive foreign operations and potential FCPA exposure from those foreign operations. Under the FCPA, an acquiring company can be held liable for any prior unlawful payments made by the target company, and this successor liability can result in the termination of a proposed acquisition, as happened with Lockheed Martin’s agreement to acquire the Titan Corporation. Moreover, FCPA prosecutions and investigations in the context of mergers and acquisitions are on the rise. 

 

In addition to the regulatory restrictions, flexible acquisition structures and tax planning must also be considered in any inbound transaction. For example, foreign buyers expecting payment streams from their U.S. acquisitions – be it dividends, interest, royalties, rent or service fees – should take steps to minimize cross-border withholding taxes. To achieve this, properly advised acquirers will consider interposing an intermediate holding company, located in a country with favorable tax treaties or other tax attributes, such that overall taxes are minimized on payments that cross borders. U.S. state and local tax issues will also almost certainly be a consideration, particularly if these jurisdictions offer tax credits or other special incentives.

 

Despite the spectrum of issues and its attendant complexity, properly advised U.S. sellers and foreign buyers will be well positioned to participate in the growing trend of inbound deals.

Possible Cnooc Oil Lease Acquisition Leads to Speculation over CFIUS Involvement

Late last week reports surfaced that the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (Cnooc), China’s state-owned energy company, was in unconfirmed discussions with Norway’s StatoilHydro ASA to acquire oil lease interests in the Gulf of Mexico. A completed transaction would open up oil reserves in the U.S. Gulf to China for the first time. The fact that a Chinese company is involved has led to speculation whether the U.S. will resist this particular foreign direct investment, recalling the political furor that resulted in Cnooc’s unsuccessful 2005 bid to acquire Unocal Corp. 

Environmental Capital blog linked to a Wall Street Journal’s report that StatoilHydro had put five prospects up for sale, a small portion of its Gulf of Mexico assets. The Financial Times wrote that the transaction would have a value of approximately $100 million and that the proceeds would be used to cover the costs of drilling wells rather than to obtain acreage. According to Energy-pedia, StatoilHydro will remain majority owner of any projects for which it brings in partners, noting that oil companies typically offer partnerships in large exploration projects to help pay for drilling and spread risk. 

Generating alarmism, Business Insider first claims that China’s overseas acquisition program is approaching the U.S. and then becomes somewhat more balanced: 

[T]he political tides have changed. In 2005, it was easy to block investments on political grounds, because there was no shortage of cash. Plus, this is just a few leases -- putting their toe in the water, it looks like -- not an $18.5 billion bid for a U.S. company.

Still expect all kinds of howls before this goes through.

Assume that the media has accurately outlined the transaction. Will the transaction between StatoilHydro and Cnooc be a “covered transaction” under the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA)? If so, will the parties then make a voluntary filing with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)?

Not every transaction involving a non-U.S. investor and a U.S. business is subject to FINSA. Only a transaction that “could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person” is. A transaction that satisfies this transfer of control test is a “covered transaction.” But not every “covered transaction” is subject to FINSA. The general structure of FINSA is that parties to a covered transaction may file a notice with CFIUS for its review and, possibly, further investigation or Presidential action. If the parties do not file a notice, then CFIUS can block the transaction or later unwind it. The purpose of the CFIUS review and investigation is to determine whether the proposed transaction might impair U.S. national security. 

CFIUS has published regulations that detail the coverage of FINSA, the review process and the contents of the voluntary filing. Applying the facts of the Cnooc discussions to the regulations produces some interesting results:

Does the fact that a Norwegian entity owns the oil leases save the deal from regulatory review? No. A U.S. business is subject to the regulations and to FINSA regardless of the nationality of the person that controls it.[1]

Are the oil leases a U.S. business? To be a U.S. business, the leases must be an entity engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.[2] Are they? The regulations define “entity” to include “assets (whether or not organized as a separate legal entity) operated by any [other entity] as a business undertaking in a particular location or for particular products or services.”[3] Therefore, the leases could be an “entity.”

If the leases are an entity, is the entity engaged in interstate commerce in the United States? The wells are offshore, and not located within the boundaries of any state of the United States, as can be seen from the map published by Energy-pedia. The media coverage says that the leases are located in the “U.S. Gulf.” Is that a state or is it not?

Also, since the wells appear to not yet be operating, are the assets engaged in any commerce at all?

Under the regulations, certain transactions are not covered transactions, including the “acquisition of any part of an entity or of assets, if such part of an entity or assets do not constitute a U.S. business.”[4] There is an example in the regulation of a foreign person acquiring individual discrete assets -- including land -- from a U.S. business. The example concludes that the acquisition is not a covered transaction. 

If its purpose is to finance drilling, rather than to obtain acreage, then the proposed transaction is an investment, not an acquisition. FINSA, however, applies to investments if control is tranferred. The structure of the deal may be that Cnooc will obtain lease interests. If these interests do not have rights to vote for directors or vote on other matters affecting the entity, then the interests are not voting interests and there may be no “control” aspect to the transaction at all.[5]

Lastly, if Cnooc is acquiring interests from StatoilHydro without any intent to exercise control, then Cnooc may be acquiring the interests or the leases “solely for the purpose of passive investment,” and the investment may be exempt from FINSA on that basis.[6] The observation that StatoilHydro intends to remain in operating control supports this view. 

Overall, there could be several bases for the legal conclusion that the proposed deal would not be a covered transaction under FINSA. Cnooc and StatoilHydro will no doubt take their own business assessment of their situation. It will be interesting to see if the views coalesce or diverge. 

All references are to Sections of the CFIUS regulations: 

[1] Section 226

[2] Section 226

[3] Section 211

[4] Section 302(c)

[5] Section 228

[6] Section 302(b)