Does Firstgold Really Mean That CFIUS Has Gone Hostile?

The withdrawal of the Chinese acquirer in Firstgold transaction has ignited a debate over whether U.S. investment policy has become more restrictive with respect to China. In fact, Firstgold is unlikely to be a reliable indicator of the policy or regulatory direction of the U.S. government. Firstgold presented an unusual set of facts, did not truly involve U.S. critical infrastructure and has little economic significance. The regulatory outcome was determined well before the blowup between Google and the Chinese government occurred earlier this month. Commentators should be wary before generalizing from the Firstgold outcome, as incorrect observations may reduce offshore investment interest in the U.S.  

The Financial Times reported earlier this month in an article bylined by its Beijing-based reporter Kathrin Hille that Chinese companies are expecting tougher scrutiny in the United States. This change is linked to Google’s announcement that Chinese hackers had accessed its systems and those of 20 other companies. Google’s stand might affect both inbound investors and companies already present in the U.S. The article reported that the failure of the Firstgold investment is an indicator of the Obama administration’s enhanced scrutiny of Chinese investment infrastructure. 

 

The Firstgold investment was not a conventional inbound investment. The company’s SEC reports contain unusual facts. Firstgold has been an exploration stage company with only minor operations since 1995. Its assets are principally property and equipment for gold prospecting at four sites in Nevada. It is financially distressed. Its audit included a going concern qualification. It must raise capital to survive. Its two hedge fund investors sued it for securities fraud 10 months after making their loans. The Chinese investor, Northwest Non-Ferrous International Investment Company Limited, intended to not merely invest in Firstgold, but to acquire the outstanding senior secured debt from the hedge funds, loan additional funds to Firstgold and invest enough to own 51% of the Company’s equity. The total investment package was valued at $26,500,000 but less than $10,000,000 was an equity investment in the company itself. Firstgold did not file its application with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) until three months after the deal was first announced. Firstgold did have a property located in Fallon, Nevada, 50 miles from a U.S. Naval air facility that tests advanced weapons. It was this proximity that led the staff of CFIUS to conclude that there were national security concerns.

 

Firstgold’s assets are not critical infrastructure. The regulations promulgated under the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 define critical infrastructure to be an asset so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of the particular asset would have a debilitating impact on national security. Firstgold’s assets do not satisfy that standard. Critical infrastructure is not an issue in the case.

 

Firstgold has no economic significance. In its 15-year history, it has produced no material revenues. Because it is not an active mining operation, it is not a factor in the local Nevada economy. Its debt is in default, and it is subject to foreclosure proceedings. The real importance of the transaction was the bailout of its lenders who thought they could offload their position at a favorable price. The value of Firstgold’s stock is questionable, since there are outstanding cheap warrants equal to 26% of the outstanding shares, a significant overhang. In fact, there was a period during 2009 where Firstgold’s stock could not be traded since it had failed to file its reports with the SEC.

 

On the other hand, it truly is difficult to understand what CFIUS gained from blocking this deal, in which case it may be that its action can only be a signal for a new hawkish outlook. In November 2008 CFIUS published a list of 11 illustrative factors that it will consider in determining whether a covered transaction poses national security risk. The Firstgold deal seems to present none of them. The CFIUS Guidance also discussed transactions that have presented national security considerations because of the nature of the U.S. business over which control is being acquired. Geographic location is not mentioned as a determinative factor. Because Firstgold has no products, it is not able to have products that may have implications for U.S. national security. It is possible that CFIUS determined that the buyer was acting on behalf of the Chinese government. If so, CFIUS never mentioned it. Therefore, if CFIUS intended to send a message, the message may be that a Chinese investor has the burden of proving it is not acting for the PRC government. Given the size of the transaction and the relative obscurity of the parties, however, it is difficult that CFIUS meant for its action to be considered a bellweather for other China-originated transactions. 

 

It’s appropriate for the media to be alert to policy changes that result from Google’s startling announcement. Reading tea leaves is a tricky business, however, and in the world of commerce, the media should refrain from issuing baseless alarms when the U.S. economy is earnestly seeking foreign direct investment. The rational view is that, all in all, there was little compelling reason once the national security monitors raised doubt as to the real reason for the transaction, for CFIUS to permit the Firstgold deal to go ahead. Had there been some compelling showing that the deal had a rational basis as a business investment, CFIUS would have approved it.

FDI Issues to Track in 2010

FDI promises to grow in importance to both developed and the developing economies in the new year. The world economy as a whole has not fully recovered from the slowdown of the past three years. What recovery has occurred has been selective, leading to stronger economies in some cases and leaving weaker economies in others. The imbalance suggests that opportunities for cross-border investments and M&A activities will abound and that those businesses, funds and individuals that have available capital will likely pursue them.

Heightened FDI activity will raise issues in the media, in academia and elsewhere. The issues that will garner the greatest attention are likely to be:

  • Protectionism. If there is a sudden, large upturn in FDI into developed economies, will more inbound transactions be challenged by regulatory authorities? At the end of 2009, the Obama administration prevented the acquisition of FirstGold by a Chinese acquirer on national security grounds. Will this be interpreted as protectionism disguised? CFIUS has rarely outright blocked deals in the past, so a moderate increase in number of challenged deals may well be interpreted as a change in political attitude. Complicating the assessment is that foreign buyers will likely be shopping for natural resources business and high technology firms – both of which may have assets that are inordinately valuable and difficult to find elsewhere. These values may raise the stakes to investee nations when control of these assets is shifted offshore.
  • Credit Squeeze. Buyers and investors with strong credit lines will likely be very attractive to targets who are starved for debt and equity capital. Distressed assets are in strong supply and can often be revitalized with infusions from capital from new owners with adequate capital supplies. Will buyers and investors remain disciplined and limit their capital at risk, or will there be “shopping sprees” as holdout sellers give up, price spreads narrow and well-endowed players run the table?
  • FDI Extends the Service Sector. Economies that have built their capacities and economic fortunes on exports of manufactured goods with price advantages will seek to compete more aggressively by incorporating more of the value chain into their enterprises. They may wish to acquire design capability and marketing interface directly with their ultimate customers. Confronted with the question of “buy or build,” some businesses will look to acquire or invest in businesses that provide those services. This means businesses whose assets go home at night. From an operational perspective, this will raise issues of conflicting corporate cultures. Return on investments into service companies can also be more difficult to measure than investments in hard assets. The range of results on these deals will likely be broader than in other investments.
  • Developed Assets More Desirable. For investors in the U.S. and Europe, assets – both hard and soft – that are developed and therefore require minimal additional expenditure, are likely to be more desirable than those requiring considerable additional investment. Consequently, in both developed and developing economies, greenfield investments may have a difficult time competing for investment capital. For outbound investors in China – where capital appears to be less constrained and risk tolerance may be greater – greenfield investments in the energy and agricultural sectors will remain top priorities. There may be a strong divergence that is building, with those economies and businesses in need of significant capital infusions turning away from investors in the developed nations and looking almost exclusively to investors in emerging economies.
  • What Direction for Global M&A? The year 2009 brought a large number of strategic cross-border mergers and acquisitions, many with high profiles. The trend toward consolidation within industries will accelerate – the Kraft/Cadbury transaction being the poster child for these deals. Absent from the space at this time are the financial players, such as the private equity funds who have relied on leverage to complete their acquisitions and generate their returns. Will private equity and other private investors step back into the ring before credit has become more available, or will financial deals continue to lag strategic deals? The lack of clarity ahead for many businesses also adds uncertainty regarding valuation and pricing. With these factors taken all together, the return of robust cross-border M&A transactions does not seem imminent.

If we gain information on these FDI issues in the next six months, then the last half of 2010 may appear to be more predictable, especially if it is more in line with past trends. Given the change in direction that 2008 and 2009 brought compared to the immediately preceding years, any predictions – at any point – may deny the reality that volatility persists, even in FDI.

FDI Trends and Policies Tracked in New UNCTAD Publications

 

Earlier this month the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development released two significant new publications. On December 1, UNCTAD released its inital Global Investment Trends Monitor. The publication reported data on global foreign direct investment (FDI) for the second and third quarters of 2009. On December 4, the UNCTAD Secretariat published its first Investment Policy Monitor. The aim of the Monitor is to provide the international investment community with current developments in foreign investment policies at both the national and international levels.

UNCTAD intends to publish its Investment Trends Monitor quarterly to provide the international investment community with regular assessments of global FDI. UNCTAD has developed its own index to measure FDI, based on FDI data for 67 economies that comprise 90% of FDI flows. The Investment Trends Monitor recorded an increase in global FDI from Q1 to Q2 of 2009. Specifically, the index rose 65% to 115 on a quarter-over-quarter basis. The increase was the first posted in five consecutive quarters. The G20 countries alone produced a 38% increase, according to the Index, but the increase affected only certain countries in the G20. Increases in the emerging economies were more limited. The Monitor warns that a full global recovery might not yet be underway, citing two reasons. First, cross-border global M&A was flat during the first three quarters of 2009. Second, the number of international, greenfield investment projects declined for the fifth consecutive quarter. The publication predicts that FDI flows for the third quarter will not show material improvement and will remain significantly below the year-earlier levels, but offers the optimistic prediction that “the overall environment for international investment is slowly improving.”

The Investment Policy Monitor assesses the national policy frameworks reflecting attitudes toward FDI. The report notes that during 2009 the majority of the 51 changes analyzed were for the “liberalization, facilitation and promotion” of inbound FDI. The report interprets this majority to mean that countries continue to believe that FDI is a means to finance their economic recoveries and promote their economic growth. The remainder of the changes included prohibition of foreign participation in certain industries, modifications to screening requirements and tightenings of regimes on investments that may relate to national security. The analysis differentiates between changes in the G20 countries and in non-G20 countries. The Investment Policy Monitor also follows changes in the general legal framework relevant to foreign investors in taxation regimes, state aid and stimulus packages. The report notes that between July and November 2009, 34 countries undertook measures related to foreign investment and 31 enacted state aid or stimulus packages or otherwise enhanced earlier such initiatives. Also included are new international investment agreements (including bilateral investment treaties) and double taxation treaties. All together, 82 economies were direct parties to new agreements in 2009.

Both publications include useful hard data and metrics and, for that reason alone, should prove exceedingly useful in the months ahead as FDI participates in and generates the expected global recovery.

UNCTAD was established in 1964 with the goal of promoting sustainable development while integrating developing countries into the world economy.

CFIUS Finds the Headlines in a Golden Investment Deal

A relatively small proposed investment in Firstgold Corp. of Lovelock, Nevada, a development stage mining company, has lead to a flurry of press coverage of the refusal by the U.S. Treasury’s Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to permit the deal. 

The proposed investor is Northwest Non-Ferrous International Investment Company Limited of Xi’an, China. Firstgold is a small-cap, financially-challenged gold mining business with four tracts in Nevada, but little operating history—in its own words, “a junior mining and exploration company.” The deal size has not been disclosed and may be less than $10 million. The deal structure involves three parts—the acquisition of senior secured debt from a disgruntled private investor, an additional loan to Firstgold and a purchase of a control equity stake, making Northwest both Firstgold’s parent and secured lender. The deal was first announced in July 2009. The parties did not make their CFIUS filing until late September.

After both a review and an investigation, CFIUS is recommending that the President disapprove the transaction. According to CNNMoney’s report, CFIUS apparently based its rejection on the proximity of one of Firstgold’s properties to Fallon Naval Air Station and offered several mitigation possibilities, none of which Firstgold accepted. The company states that the air base is 50 miles away. 

There is other speculation that the investor would use Firstgold’s gold assets—even if undeveloped at this point—to add to China’s hoard of gold, now totaling a staggering estimated $1.95 trillion. China’s gold reserves exceed Switzerland’s. 

Other news reports and blogs covering the development include:

This blog, in its October 1 post, alerted readers to the possibility of an unfavorable CFIUS outcome. We noted that management did not seem to approach the CFIUS filing with seriousness and as recently as October had predicted that its CFIUS filing would not be problematic.

The furor surrounding this development has an interesting footnote. The California Gold Rush of 1848-52 began with the discovery on gold on Mexican soil, specifically on land owned by a Swiss farmer, John Sutter—and ultimately led to the annexation of California by the United States. So there may well be historical precedent for the concerns of CFIUS. 

 

Updated  On December 22, Northwest withdrew from the transaction, Reuters announced.  Therefore, President Obama will not have to take direct action to disapprove the deal. 

Fiction vs. Fact in Tales of Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign direct investment has often created dismay and resistance in the investee nation. Self-appointed pundits may try to gain populist following by decrying the sale of local assets to foreign buyers with no regard to the historic contribution foreign ownership has made to the growth of their own economies.

Governmental regulation of foreign direct investment is implemented in part to allay these emotions by screening out those investments judged harmful according to legislated standards. It therefore is counterintuitive when the exercise of regulatory power to screen foreign direct investment also inspires equally ill-tempered reactions. Often, the sound and fury of those reactions do not withstand factual analysis, especially when journalists seek to stir the pot of public emotions. 

Take, for example, “US inquiry into sale of Virgin Galactic stake to Arab investor” which appeared in the online version of The Times of London earlier this week, written by Abu Dhabi based-reporter David Robertson. The Rocketeers and ParabolicArc blogs posted the same story. The story questions why the U.S. has elected to subject the proposed sale of a 32% stake in Sir Richard Branson’s privately-held space travel venture to Abu Dhabi-based Aabar Investments for $280 million to “a national security investigation” and whether the investigation genuinely serves the legitimate interests of the United States. 

Virgin Galactic and Aabar Investments had originally announced their deal in July 2009. The deal includes not only the equity investment but also Aabar’s commitment to fund a small satellite launch capability. 

Timesonline does not point out that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), has reviewed over 300 transactions during the three years ended December 31, 2008 or that filings with CFIUS that seek its review are optional. However, CFIUS may initiate its own review of inbound transactions and, if it finds that a transaction may adversely affect U.S. national security, it can take remedial steps, including rescission. As a result, a prudent inbound investor and its investee will seek CFIUS review to insure that the transaction is permanently settled. Review is the first level of the regulatory process. Investigation is the second level. If review of a filing finds that the transaction could result in control of a U.S. business by an entity that is controlled by a foreign government, then FINSA and its regulations require an investigation unless CFIUS otherwise determines. Given this legal framework, CFIUS could have had sound reasons for subjecting Virgin’s deal to the second level of investigation. The fact that there is an investigation does not, however, suggest that the outcome will be adverse to Aabar.

The Timesonline report suggests that investors in the Arab Middle East will become concerned that their investments in the U.S. are subject to CFIUS review. According to the public version of the CFIUS annual report released last month, during 2006, 2007 and 2008, 11 transactions involving UAE investors or acquirers were filed for CFIUS review. During the same period, 14 transactions from Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were filed. Deals originating in Saudi Arabia alone comprised 7% of the total value of completed transactions. Without regard to this body of facts, the writer drags up the divestiture outcome that followed Dubai World’s acquisition of P&O, a deal that CFIUS found did not impair national security and that did close. 

It certainly is legitimate to argue that the statute that CFIUS enforces has an incorrect premise with regard to government-controlled entities. It also is legitimate to argue that the term “national security” is not sufficient well-defined and gives CFIUS too much discretion and the overwhelmingly powerful argument is that Sir Richard Branson is not very likely to have transferred control of Virgin Galactic, despite the size of Aabar’s investment. But, in a government where the legislative branch makes the laws and the executive branch is charged with carrying out those laws, CFIUS is performing as it must. Moreover, CFIUS has taken steps to make the public aware of its views by publishing guidance regarding the types of transactions that it has reviewed and that have presented national security implications.

There is an additional fact that would have put much of this faux fury into perspective. Aabar now owns 4% of U.S.-based Tesla Motors, the electric car company that is a contender to lead the United States into the age of the electric car. In July 2009, Aabar acquired its investment stake in Tesla from Daimler. Because of the confidentiality of the proceedings of CFIUS, there is no way to know whether CFIUS reviewed the transactions that led to Aabar’s stockholding in Tesla. At a minimum, Aabar and its controlling family are not strangers to CFIUS. They have been welcomed into the U.S. in the past and no doubt they will be welcomed here again.

The New York Times coverage of the Virgin Galactic deal, published today, is infinitely more balanced and informative. Reporter Eric Lipton went into the subtleties and difficulties that underlie regulatory judgments regarding FDI. Factual reportage supports constructive public debate that can lead to public policies that enable FDI to produce its best results. 

Fiction vs. Fact in Tales of Foreign Direct Investment

Foreign direct investment has often created dismay and resistance in the investee nation. Self-appointed pundits may try to gain populist following by decrying the sale of local assets to foreign buyers with no regard to the historic contribution foreign ownership has made to the growth of their own economies.

Governmental regulation of foreign direct investment is implemented in part to allay these emotions by screening out those investments judged harmful according to legislated standards. It therefore is counterintuitive when the exercise of regulatory power to screen foreign direct investment also inspires equally ill-tempered reactions. Often, the sound and fury of those reactions do not withstand factual analysis, especially when journalists seek to stir the pot of public emotions. 

Take, for example, “US inquiry into sale of Virgin Galactic stake to Arab investor” which appeared in the online version of The Times of London earlier this week, written by Abu Dhabi based-reporter David Robertson. The Rocketeers and ParabolicArc blogs posted the same story. The story questions why the U.S. has elected to subject the proposed sale of a 32% stake in Sir Richard Branson’s privately-held space travel venture to Abu Dhabi-based Aabar Investments for $280 million to “a national security investigation” and whether the investigation genuinely serves the legitimate interests of the United States. 

Virgin Galactic and Aabar Investments had originally announced their deal in July 2009. The deal includes not only the equity investment but also Aabar’s commitment to fund a small satellite launch capability. 

Timesonline does not point out that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), has reviewed over 300 transactions during the three years ended December 31, 2008 or that filings with CFIUS that seek its review are optional. However, CFIUS may initiate its own review of inbound transactions and, if it finds that a transaction may adversely affect U.S. national security, it can take remedial steps, including rescission. As a result, a prudent inbound investor and its investee will seek CFIUS review to insure that the transaction is permanently settled. Review is the first level of the regulatory process. Investigation is the second level. If review of a filing finds that the transaction could result in control of a U.S. business by an entity that is controlled by a foreign government, then FINSA and its regulations require an investigation unless CFIUS otherwise determines. Given this legal framework, CFIUS could have had sound reasons for subjecting Virgin’s deal to the second level of investigation. The fact that there is an investigation does not, however, suggest that the outcome will be adverse to Aabar.

The Timesonline report suggests that investors in the Arab Middle East will become concerned that their investments in the U.S. are subject to CFIUS review. According to the public version of the CFIUS annual report released last month, during 2006, 2007 and 2008, 11 transactions involving UAE investors or acquirers were filed for CFIUS review. During the same period, 14 transactions from Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were filed. Deals originating in Saudi Arabia alone comprised 7% of the total value of completed transactions. Without regard to this body of facts, the writer drags up the divestiture outcome that followed Dubai World’s acquisition of P&O, a deal that CFIUS found did not impair national security and that did close. 

It certainly is legitimate to argue that the statute that CFIUS enforces has an incorrect premise with regard to government-controlled entities. It also is legitimate to argue that the term “national security” is not sufficient well-defined and gives CFIUS too much discretion and the overwhelmingly powerful argument is that Sir Richard Branson is not very likely to have transferred control of Virgin Galactic, despite the size of Aabar’s investment. But, in a government where the legislative branch makes the laws and the executive branch is charged with carrying out those laws, CFIUS is performing as it must. Moreover, CFIUS has taken steps to make the public aware of its views by publishing guidance regarding the types of transactions that it has reviewed and that have presented national security implications.

There is an additional fact that would have put much of this faux fury into perspective. Aabar now owns 4% of U.S.-based Tesla Motors, the electric car company that is a contender to lead the United States into the age of the electric car. In July 2009, Aabar acquired its investment stake in Tesla from Daimler. Because of the confidentiality of the proceedings of CFIUS, there is no way to know whether CFIUS reviewed the transactions that led to Aabar’s stockholding in Tesla. At a minimum, Aabar and its controlling family are not strangers to CFIUS. They have been welcomed into the U.S. in the past and no doubt they will be welcomed here again.

The New York Times coverage of the Virgin Galactic deal, published today, is infinitely more balanced and informative. Reporter Eric Lipton went into the subtleties and difficulties that underlie regulatory judgments regarding FDI. Factual reportage supports constructive public debate that can lead to public policies that enable FDI to produce its best results. 

To Bring FDI from China, U.S. Policymakers and Regulators Must Align

Will President Obama’s recent trip to China product any inbound FDI results for the U.S.? According to the U.S.-China joint statement, the November 16-18 trip produced significant agreements in five key areas of bilateral interest. There were tangential, but not explicit, mentions of FDI into the U.S. either by way of mergers and acquisitions or Greenfield investments.

Judging from the tenor and substance of the joint statement, the meetings further developed the mutual confidence and trust that are the predicates for a favorable investment climate. The five key areas of agreement were:

  • The importance and productivity of regular high-level exchanges to the growth of the overall U.S.-China relationship
  • The building of a bilateral strategic relationship that is positive, cooperative and comprehensive
  • Strengthened dialogue and cooperation on macro-economic policies leading to global recovery
  • Shared responsibility to cooperatively address regional and global security challenges
  • Vigorous responses to issues of climate change, energy and environment

The joint statement implicitly references the importance of FDI at several points. There was express recognition of the importance of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. “Both sides believed that the first round of the Dialogue held in Washington, D.C., in July this year was a fruitful one and agreed to honor in good faith the commitments made and hold the second round in Beijing in the summer of 2010.” The bottom line is that the U.S.-China FDI relationship appears well and growing and on track to produce results. Those results may not be evident until later next year. 

Further, while addressing the need to support the global recovery, the statement made clear that both sides are committed to open trade and to jointly fight protectionism and to resolve bilateral trade and investment disputes. The joint statement articulated the explicit promise of the U.S. and China “to expedite negotiation on a bilateral investment treaty.”

Prior to the release of the joint statement, reports had appeared in the Chinese press, notably the South China Morning Post, that a specific agreement would be reached to promote acquisitions of small and mid-size U.S. financial institutions by Chinese lenders. No such agreement or memorandum of understanding appears to have emerged from Obama’s visit.

A recent transaction involving a proposed takeover by China’s Minsheng Bank of failed California-based bank, UCBH Holdings, illustrates the formidable difficulties to be overcome if U.S. regulators intend to encourage Chinese lenders to invest in U.S. banks. Minsheng Bank had acquired a 9.9% interest in UCBH in 2007 and recently raised US$3.86 billion in its initial public offering in China. According to a report in The Wall Street Journal, Minsheng Bank also sought to acquire United Commercial Bank before U.S. authorities closed the San Francisco-based lender earlier this month. 

UCBH operated the United Commercial Bank, with several branches in California and also in other key Chinese American areas, such as New York, Boston, Seattle, Atlanta and Houston. United Commercial suffered commercial lending losses from loans to developers and home builders during the housing boom. A financial scandal led to a management shake-up. 

The Federal Reserve rejected China Minsheng's proposal to buy United Commercial Bank because of regulatory restrictions on foreign investment in U.S. banks and instead closed the bank. Soon after the closure, East West Bank, based in Pasadena, California, took over United Commercial Bank's roughly $7.5 billion in deposits, as well as $10.2 billion in assets. The Los Angeles Times reports that its takeover of UCBH will greatly expand its reach of East West, which has concentrated on Southern California and the San Francisco Bay Area. Interestingly, East West has a full-service branches in Hong Kong. 

The plain result of the regulatory actions is that a domestic bank with no interest in UCBH was permitted to acquire the business, while a foreign bank that always was a part owner of UCBH was not. The broader implication seems to be that any federal policy determined to promote inbound FDI will have to be based on a full and complete alignment of regulatory agencies at all levels. Otherwise, well-intentioned policies will be incapable of being executed. 

 

Huawei Technologies Ascends Despite 2008 CFIUS Turndown

In the U.S. press, almost all mention of Huawei Technologies recites like a mantra the 2008 refusal by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to permit it to participate with Bain Capital’s in Bain's proposed acquisition of 3Com Corporation. The consensus line is that CFIUS determined that Huawei’s connections with the government of the People’s Republic of China might have been too strong and therefore refused to approve the deal. The failed transaction is often cited as evidence that the U.S. government will not permit Chinese investment in or acquisition of U.S. high technology businesses. Experts contend that the outcome continues to dissuade Chinese investors from acquisitions of U.S. businesses. 

According to an article by Kevin J. O’Brien in the New York Times on November 30, however, Huawei has in a remarkably short timeframe become a communications equipment powerhouse without the 3Com acquisition and now wields significant market power both with China's mobile networks and around the globe.  

 

According to the article, Huawei now is established as a serious competitor, winning contracts from major phone networks in Europe and elsewhere on the globe, beating the likes of Ericsson and Nokia Siemens Networks. Huawei has a 20.1% market share of the global equipment market. It ranks as the number 2 supplier of mobile phone systems in the world. Its quarterly sales now are greater than Alcatel-Lucent and Nokia Siemens. It supplies 36 of the top 50 mobile operators, including Cox Communications, Leap and Clearwire in the U.S. The article reports that customers have investigated the ownership of Huwaei, said to be a private company, and concluded that its ownership would not be a factor.

 

It seems likely that U.S. companies will increasingly become customers of Huawei because of its versatile products and their low cost of operation. Huawei has obviously found a way to prosper here and elsewhereeven if the U.S. government did not think it a suitable owner for a U.S. business. It’s not clear whether the CFIUS decision produced any long-term benefit here at all. And it’s certainly not clear from what national security risk CFIUS protected the U.S.

 

The ascension of Huawei to prime global competitor status illustrates that a robust multinational high technology enterprise does not need a U.S. base, whether bought or built. Regrettably, it also demonstrates that as a result of the CFIUS decision, the U.S. has lost out on direct contributions to its economy through jobs, purchases from local U.S. vendors and the use of U.S-created R&D. 

 

Nationalist Sentiment vs. FDI: Bharti Airtel Leads to Important Questions re: Candid Policy Toward FDI

The proposed business combination between India’s Bharti Airtel and South Africa’s MTN Group collapsed at the beginning of last month. Local and international politics appear to have played a substantial role in its demise. Therefore, some important questions should be posed. To what extent was the collapse a result of nationalism or protectionism masquerading as a different public policy? Is the withdrawal of that deal evidence of a wider global trend that may make foreign direct investment (FDI) more difficult to execute? As government stimulus programs end, will governments—U.S. and otherwise—use their power to shield companies that have been nursed through the downturn from foreign takeovers? 

Bharti is Asia’s leading integrated telecom services provider, with operations in India and Sri Lanka. MTN is South Africa’s leading mobile and fixed-line telecom company, with over 100 million subscribers and operations in over 20 countries in Africa and the Middle East. Their proposed combination was negotiated from the end of May to the end of September and had a value of approximately $24 billion. Bharti would have received a 49% stake in MTN, while MTN and its shareholders would have received a 36% stake in Bharti. The combined enterprise would have been the world’s third largest telecom company. 

The ominous notes for FDI come from reports in Dealbook and elsewhere that the South African government failed to approve the transaction because of protectionism and nation-building policies. This outcome was not necessarily predictable because both the Indian and South African governments have supported increased trade among developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. That “South–South” trade is intended to offset growing Chinese economic influence in the region.

Dealbook also reported that interventions by both Indian and South African governments imposed conditions that led to the end of the deal. The South African government required that MTN keep South African management in place and maintain a listing on the Johannesburg stock exchange in addition to its listing on the Mumbai exchange. Indian financial regulators were unwilling to waive their rules against dual listings. 

The South African blog SAgoodnews pointed out that there is a long history of dual listed companies and saw no reason why that requirement should have been terminal for the transaction. The blog also dismisses arguments that national political and labor pressures were at fault.

The Indian blog Trak.in News asserts that the Indian government had backed the deal at the highest level, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressly giving the combination his support. The blog also suggests that the real issue was whether the national character of the combined business would be Indian of South African. South Africa’s insistence on the dual listing was a cover for this point. On the other side, the Indian authorities believed, but seem not to have stated, that the dual listing would effectively set a conversion rate for the rupee that could differ from the official rate of exchange. 

Both companies’ share prices rose after termination was announced. Stock analysts who had trepidations were pleased to see the transaction crater. It therefore is possible that, in addition to political agendas, there were financial issues underlying the headline events. Investors may not have been as supportive of the transaction as were the managements of Bharti and MTN. 

After September 30, both governments issued the usual palliatives, saying that they remain open for business and underscoring the importance of FDI. Rather than helping business decide whether to pursue cross-border deals in emerging economies, however, these positions and unarticulated rationales only obscure the facts. The recovery from the worldwide turndown is in its early stages. Obfuscations and half-truths do not bring recovery any nearer, as they only add uncertainty where business strategists would prefer to deal with articulated policies and certainties. 

What is true for developing economies such as South Africa and India is also true for the United States. Efforts to generate inbound investment must be very transparent and free from hidden conditions. Actual decisions and measures must align with policy pronouncements. In an environment in which the U.S. is hotly competing with other countries for inbound FDI, the U.S. government cannot afford to be less than utterly committed to inbound investors. Anything less will lead those investors to look for greener pastures—a lesson that South Africa may yet learn. 

Will Inbound M&A Transactions Emanate from Russia?

Although multinational enterprises (MNEs) from developed economies are likely to provide substantial outbound foreign direct investment to the United States by way of M&A transactions, buyers from other nations are gaining presence. The role of Russian MNEs and investors as buyers may be increasing. 

A publication earlier this month by the Vale Columbia Center quantifies the importance of Russia as a source of outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) for the United States and other developed nations. Professor Andrei Panibratov, Associate Professor of the Graduate School of Management of Saint Petersburg State University, and Kalman Kalotay, Economic Affairs Officer at UNCTAD in Geneva, Switzerland, authored the profile to highlight the increasing importance of Russia’s FDI program. The profile demonstrates that Russian direct investors are continuing to penetrate foreign markets and undergo a process of internationalization. The authors suggest that a carefully considered policy from Russia’s government would significantly enhance the benefits to Russia from its OFDI.  

According to the publication, various motives drive Russian OFDI: 

  • The desire of managers and owners to control or offset Russia’s political and economic risks 
  • Expected profitability of the investments themselves
  • Expectations for better global recognition

Although Russia’s OFDI fell by 15% in the first quarter of 2009, compared with the first quarter of 2009, at the end of 2008 Russia held the second largest stock of foreign direct investments among the emerging economies, aggregating US $203 billion. This stock exceeds the investments held by Brazilian, Chinese and Indian multinationals. Between 1995 and 2007, Russia’s offshore investments grew more rapidly than did the investments of Brazil, China and India. Mergers and acquisitions by Russia’s multinationals from January 2005 through June 2008 were over ten times the volume during the 2001 through 2004 period. There are 50 to 60 Russian multinationals that account for a significant part of offshore acquisitions. The total number of Russian MNEs investing offshore exceeds 1,000, the authors believe. 

 

Among the 2009 inbound U.S. transactions was the purchase by Trubnaya Metallurgicheskaya Kompaniya OAO (TNK) of a 49% interest in Kentucky-based NS Group Inc. for an undisclosed amount. NS Group is a manufacturer of tubular goods.

 

It’s worth noting that the 2007 acquisition of publicly-owned Oregon Steel Mills by Evraz Group SA, a Luxembourg company with Russian affiliation, cleared the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) without much apparent problem, unlike transactions originating in other emerging market economies. Most of these business operate in the oil and gas, metallurgy, finance and communications industries. 

All of which suggests that Russia may provide fertile soil for inbound deals. 

The report is the first in a series of Columbia FDI Profiles that the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment has recently launched. Material in this post is reprinted with permission from the Center (www.vcc.columbia.edu).